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Cooling, Benjamin Franklin Counter-Thrust: From the Peninsula to the
Antietam. University of Nebraska Press, $45.00 hardcover ISBN
9780803215153
Command and Leadership in the Antietam Campaign
The University of Nebraska Press's Great Campaigns of the Civil War series
features excellent scholarship, crisp writing, and syntheses that incorporate the
best and most recent historiography of the subject at hand. Benjamin Franklin
Cooling's Counter-Thrust: From the Peninsula to the Antietam, the tenth in the
series, displays all the above-mentioned traits. Counter-Thrust examines the
Eastern Theater from the end of the Peninsular Campaign in early July 1862 to
the Battle of Antietam on 17 September 1862 and Lincoln's issuance of the
preliminary Emancipation Proclamation a week later.
Counter-Thrust focuses on the relationship of the political/military high
commands with the leaders of the armies. Considering the failures of the
Federals in the Eastern Theater during this time frame, the dispiriting results of
the Seven Days, the disaster at Second Bull Run, and the failure to properly
follow up the hard fighting at Antietam, it makes sense that Cooling spends more
time analyzing the Federals than their Rebel counterparts. Confederate General
Robert E. Lee and President Jefferson Davis generally saw eye-to-eye, unlike
Lincoln, members of his staff and Major Generals George B. McClellan and
John Pope. A constant friction between members of the Lincoln administration
and McClellan was whether to make the conflict a hard war, namely to destroy
civilian property that might aid the Confederates, or liberate the slaves who
played such a vital role to the southern war effort.
McClellan loathed taking the next logical step to destroy civilian property or
strike at the reservoir of slave labor at the Confederacy's disposal. After his less
than stellar performance on the Peninsula, McClellan was shoved aside in favor
of a general who was more in line with Lincoln in making it a harder war on the
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Confederate population, Pope. The Federal drubbing endured at Second Bull
Run discredited the hard-war advocate Pope, and in desperation Lincoln was
forcedùdespite the pleas of some in his cabinetùto turn to McClellan to revitalize
turn war effort in the east. McClellan did a remarkable job of inspiring and
re-organizing the Army of the Potomac in a short period of time. The Federals
fought Lee to a tactical draw at Antietam, but in the process so weakened the
Rebel Army of Northern Virginia that it retreated south across the Potomac
River. Yet, ironically enough, it was soft-war advocate McClellan's perceived
victory at Antietam that allowed Lincoln to issue the preliminary Emancipation
Proclamation a week later to fundamentally change the nature of the war.
Although Counter-Thrust's assertions are not overly controversial, Cooling
does dispute Antietam as the seminal watershed of the conflict. Cooling argues
The refusal of Confederate leaders, soldiery, and populace to regard Lee's
abortive expedition (as well as those in Kentucky and elsewhere) as defeats
renders questionable modern assertions that Antietam in particular was the
pivotal turning point of the war(xiv). Certainly, THE claim of most significant
engagement of the entire war can be argued ad infinitum. However, the argument
that because the soldiers and people did not recognize Antietam's defeatùand the
subsequent issuance of the preliminary Emancipation Proclamationùis not the
most persuasive argument that could have been used. It has only been in
hindsight that historians have come to appreciate the true significance of
Antietam, its role in the Emancipation Proclamation, and the eventual Federal
victory. This is a minor point and does not detract from Cooling's excellent
study.
Cooling's analysis of McClellan is especially insightful, as he synthesizes
the latest scholarship on that enigmatic figure. Although critical, Cooling gives
Mac more credit than most historians believe he deserves. One example is when
Cooling discusses whether McClellan could have forced a crossing of the James
River and captured Richmond in 1862 (30). Cooling is perhaps a bit too kind to
McClellan. He rightly states that Grant could not do it in 1864, and the latter had
the national political and military leadership squarely behind him. No doubt.
However, the problem is that McClellan was no Grant, and never exhibited the
kind of aggressiveness that Grant consistently displayed. To have forced a
crossing of the James in 1862 required McClellan to be something he never was,
with or without support from Washington.
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Overall Counter-Thrust delivers as advertised with thorough research,
historiographical knowledge and excellent writing, melding this with sharp
analysis. It is a worthy addition to the University of Nebraska's Great
Campaigns of the Civil War series.
Dr. Terry Beckenbaugh is an assistant professor of Military History at the
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
His research focuses on Major General Samuel Ryan Curtis and the Civil War in
the Trans-Mississippi.
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